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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
decade-old trend of allowing the states to levy sales taxes indi-
rectly on the government, through private contractors, when
such action has not been expressly prohibited by congressional
action.26 The implication of the instant decision is that the Court
will examine state taxes to determine where the economic bur-
den ultimately lies. The legal incidence fiction seems to have
been in effect abandoned, at least for the present time. The dis-
senting opinion refers to the majority opinion as a "long step
backwards,' 27 but there is no definite indication that the Court
has re-established a variation of the old strict immunity doc-
trine.
The present decision does place a certain limitation upon
state taxation of private individuals' purchases when made for
use in fulfilling government contracts. Thereby, it is possible for
the government to deprive the states of substantial revenues by
employing private contractors as purchasing agents and impart-
ing to them the government's immunity from state taxation. In
the event there is too great a burden imposed on the states by
this latter practice, the Court might well offer a remedy by
reverting to the legal incidence principle.
It is submitted that this decision is questionable since it
insufficiently distinguished the King & Boozer case. Even if the
majority opinion were justified in distinguishing this case, it is
evident that the Court has imposed a substantial limitation on
the states' taxing power by granting immunity from state taxa-
tion to private contractors acting as purchasing agents of the
government.
Huntington Odom
CONTRACTS-IMPLIED ASSIGNMENT-ARTICLE 2011,
LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE OF 1870
The purchaser of a home from a subdivision developer
brought action against the contractor's surety, alleging non-
completion of the building contract and defective work. His
action was based on .the combined recordation of the contract
and surety bond between the vendor and the contractor. The
district court found no privity of contract between the purchaser
26. Congress may grant express immunity to private contractors in its
employ. See note 18 supra.
27. See note 25 supra.
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and the surety and dismissed the suit for no cause of action.
The Supreme Court reversed and held that under Article 2011 of
the Civil Code, a right resulting from a contract relative to im-
movable property passes with the property and the purchaser
of the house had a right of direct action against the surety.
Breaux v. Laird, 223 La. 446, 65 So.2d 907 (1953).
The decision reached in the instant case and connected cases1
involves a rule of law which has not been applied frequently in
Louisiana jurisprudence and which now is applied for the first
time to a new situation. That rule is expounded in Article 2011:
"Not only the obligation, but the right resulting from a
contract relative to immovable property, passes with the
property. Thus the right of servitude in favor of immovable
property passes with it, and thus also the heir or other
acquirer will have the right to enforce a contract made for
the improvement of the property by the person from whom
he acquired it."
Article 2011 implements Article 2009, which provides that "All
rights, acquired by a heritable obligation, may be assigned; this
assignment may be made, expressly by contract granting such
right or impliedly by the conveyance of the property to which
they are attached.'" Neither of these articles of the Code have
counterparts in the French Civil Code. They were added to the
Louisiana Civil Code in the Projet of 1825,3 and were undoubtedly
taken from the writings of Toullier.4 Toullier discusses the prob-
lems dealt with in these articles. In presenting an example he
quotes excerpts from Paulus and Pomponius found in the
Digest of Justinian.5
1. Fourteen other suits were brought against the same defendant and
judgment consolidated in the instant case. 223 La. 452-65, 65 So.2d 909-913
(1953). See also The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1952-1958
Term-Sales, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 144, 145 (1953).
2. The wording of Article 2009 may prove confusing. The redactors of
the Code were no doubt referring to heritable rights, not to "heritable
obligations."
3. Compiled Editions of the Civil Codes of Louisiana, 1 LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES
272 (1937).
4. Id. at viii-ix, xxv-xxvi. See also 3 TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 485,
nos 422 et seq. (1833). Toullier gave the example of the rights arising from
a contract with an architect for the improvement of the land passing with
the land.
5. DIGEST 2.14.17.5. It may be of interest to note that the customs of
Northern France were different from the Roman law in this respect. Pothier,
as cited by TOULLIER, op. cit. supra note 4, in his discussion of French cus-
toms, held the contrary view. Pothier considered such rights as movables, and
gave the example of a succession where one son inherited the immovables
and the other son the movables. The rights arising from the contract could
not then be enforced, since one possessed nothing and the other had no
interest.
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Article 2011 implies a tacit assignment of rights resulting
from contracts relative to immovable property. These rights
must be distinguished from real obligations such as mortgages
and rent charges which encumber the right of ownership of
subsequent holders of the property until satisfied. It may be
presumed, since Article 2011 assumes a tacit assignment, that the
rules of assignment thus apply.6 In such event, under the facts
of Breaux v. Laird, if the contractor's surety, without notice of
the sale of the property, had settled with the vendor for the
defective construction, apparently the vendee would have lost
his cause of action against the surety. Article 2644 provides that
if the debtor makes payment to the transferor prior to notice of
the transfer, the debtor is discharged of the debt.7
Article 2011 mentions only two examples of the types of
rights which pass with a transfer of the property: (1) the rights
arising from servitudes in favor of the immovable; and (2) the
rights arising from contracts for the improvement of the land.
While the instant case is clearly covered by the latter example,
the question arises as to whether or not the examples given are
exhaustive. A search of the jurisprudence reveals few applica-
tions of Article 2011. It has been used by the courts to enforce
the rights arising from a contract of lease8 and to enforce the
rights of a servitude of passage.9 In Paul v. Nolen the court held
that the right arising under a contract between lessor and lessee
limiting the liability of the lessor to third persons on the land' 0
passed to the purchaser of the land." The court's decision in
that case was based on a "tacit" acceptance of the assignment by
the lessee on the basis of his continuing to reside in the house
with knowledge of the transfer. No such acceptance of the assign-
ment by the obligor appears to be required under Article 2011.
6. Arts. 2642 et seq., LA. CVIL CODE of 1870.
7. It should also be noticed that since Article 2011 does not speak of real
obligations, the rules pertaining to such obligations do not apply. For
example, there would be no requirement that these contracts be recorded for
the rights arising thereunder to pass with the property.
8. Canal & Claiborne R.R. v. Orleans Ry., 44 La. Ann. 54, 10 So. 389 (1892).
See also Hinrichs v. Tulane Educational Fund, 49 La. Ann. 1029, 22 So. 96
(1897).
9. Coguenhem v. Trosclair (Laurel Grove Co., Intervenor), 137 La. 985,
69 So. 800 (1915). See also Simoneaux v. Lebermuth & Israel Planting Co.,
Ltd., 155 La. 689, 99 So. 531 (1924). The latter case has never been followed.
10. LA. R.S. § 9:3221 (1950) (La. Acts 1932, No. 174, p. 552).
11. Paul v. Nolen, 166 So. 509 (La. App. 1936). See also Comment, 16
TULANE L. REV. 448, 454 (1942). In the Nolen case the court also upheld the
constitutionality of La. Acts 1932, No. 174, p. 552.
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The assumption, therefore, seems justified that the examples
enumerated in Article 2011 are not exclusive. 12
The decisions of the courts to date have involved only ques-
tions of the transfer of the right as distinguished from the duty.
The complications would be increased if the right that is im-
pliedly assigned is coupled with a duty resting on the assignor,
as in the case of an executory bilateral contract. If the owner
of a lot, for example, contracts for the erection of a house thereon,
but sells the land to a third party before construction begins, the
right acquired by the third party would be conditioned on the
performance of the obligations of the former owner under the
contract. The question would then arise as to whether the con-
tractor is in a position to enforce the contract against the pur-
chaser. The answer would certainly be that the obligation is
personal to the vendor and not enforceable against the vendee.
But the owner of course could not escape his obligation to the
contractor by selling the property.13 At the same time, according
to Article 2019, such a personal obligation would not pass to the
vendee unless he made it such by his own act.' 4 On the other
hand, the right to require performance by the contractor passes
to the vendee under Article 2011. Since it is conditioned on the
contractor's receiving the counter performance due to him, it
would seem to follow that an attempt on the part of the vendee
to enforce the right would be an act sufficient to make the obli-
gation personal to him. At common law, the assignee's acceptance
of an assignment of an executory bilateral contract is interpreted,
in the absence of circumstances showing a contrary intention,
as an assumption of the duties.15 Although there is nothing in
the Code on the point, such an interpretation could well be placed
on the vendee's attempt under Article 2011 to secure the benefits
of the contract.
Charles M. Lanier
12. The suggestion has also been made that the rights resulting from
fire insurance contracts could also pass in such fashion. Note, 24 TULANE
L. REV. 378, 380 (1950), discussing Sutton v. Cuppay, 41 So.2d 106 (La. App.
1949).
13. According to Art. 2192, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870, a novation is never
effected "unless the creditor has expressly declared that he intends to dis-
charge his debtor who has made the delegation."
14. Cambais v. Douglas, 167 La. 791, 120 So. 369 (1929). The facts are
different in this case, as the obligation to build the house rested in the owner
as a condition of his purchase. The court held that the obligation to build
the house was personal to the owner and did not bind subsequent trans-
ferees of the property, who were not parties to the agreement.
15. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 164 (1932).
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